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NAME | SYNOPSIS | DESCRIPTION | RETURN VALUE | ERRORS | VERSIONS | CONFORMING TO | NOTES | EXAMPLE | SEE ALSO | COLOPHON |
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SECCOMP(2) Linux Programmer's Manual SECCOMP(2)
seccomp - operate on Secure Computing state of the process
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/signal.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
int seccomp(unsigned int operation, unsigned int flags, void *args);
The seccomp() system call operates on the Secure Computing (seccomp)
state of the calling process.
Currently, Linux supports the following operation values:
SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT
The only system calls that the calling thread is permitted to
make are read(2), write(2), _exit(2) (but not exit_group(2)),
and sigreturn(2). Other system calls result in the delivery
of a SIGKILL signal. Strict secure computing mode is useful
for number-crunching applications that may need to execute
untrusted byte code, perhaps obtained by reading from a pipe
or socket.
Note that although the calling thread can no longer call
sigprocmask(2), it can use sigreturn(2) to block all signals
apart from SIGKILL and SIGSTOP. This means that alarm(2) (for
example) is not sufficient for restricting the process's
execution time. Instead, to reliably terminate the process,
SIGKILL must be used. This can be done by using
timer_create(2) with SIGEV_SIGNAL and sigev_signo set to
SIGKILL, or by using setrlimit(2) to set the hard limit for
RLIMIT_CPU.
This operation is available only if the kernel is configured
with CONFIG_SECCOMP enabled.
The value of flags must be 0, and args must be NULL.
This operation is functionally identical to the call:
prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT);
SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER
The system calls allowed are defined by a pointer to a
Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) passed via args. This argument
is a pointer to a struct sock_fprog; it can be designed to
filter arbitrary system calls and system call arguments. If
the filter is invalid, seccomp() fails, returning EINVAL in
errno.
If fork(2) or clone(2) is allowed by the filter, any child
processes will be constrained to the same system call filters
as the parent. If execve(2) is allowed, the existing filters
will be preserved across a call to execve(2).
In order to use the SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER operation, either
the caller must have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its user
namespace, or the thread must already have the no_new_privs
bit set. If that bit was not already set by an ancestor of
this thread, the thread must make the following call:
prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1);
Otherwise, the SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER operation fails and
returns EACCES in errno. This requirement ensures that an
unprivileged process cannot apply a malicious filter and then
invoke a set-user-ID or other privileged program using
execve(2), thus potentially compromising that program. (Such
a malicious filter might, for example, cause an attempt to use
setuid(2) to set the caller's user IDs to nonzero values to
instead return 0 without actually making the system call.
Thus, the program might be tricked into retaining superuser
privileges in circumstances where it is possible to influence
it to do dangerous things because it did not actually drop
privileges.)
If prctl(2) or seccomp() is allowed by the attached filter,
further filters may be added. This will increase evaluation
time, but allows for further reduction of the attack surface
during execution of a thread.
The SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER operation is available only if the
kernel is configured with CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER enabled.
When flags is 0, this operation is functionally identical to
the call:
prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, args);
The recognized flags are:
SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
When adding a new filter, synchronize all other threads
of the calling process to the same seccomp filter tree.
A "filter tree" is the ordered list of filters attached
to a thread. (Attaching identical filters in separate
seccomp() calls results in different filters from this
perspective.)
If any thread cannot synchronize to the same filter
tree, the call will not attach the new seccomp filter,
and will fail, returning the first thread ID found that
cannot synchronize. Synchronization will fail if
another thread in the same process is in
SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT or if it has attached new seccomp
filters to itself, diverging from the calling thread's
filter tree.
SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG (since Linux 4.14)
All filter return actions except SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW
should be logged. An administrator may override this
filter flag by preventing specific actions from being
logged via the /proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/actions_logged
file.
SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL (since Linux 4.14)
Test to see if an action is supported by the kernel. This
operation is helpful to confirm that the kernel knows of a
more recently added filter return action since the kernel
treats all unknown actions as SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS.
The value of flags must be 0, and args must be a pointer to an
unsigned 32-bit filter return action.
Filters
When adding filters via SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, args points to a
filter program:
struct sock_fprog {
unsigned short len; /* Number of BPF instructions */
struct sock_filter *filter; /* Pointer to array of
BPF instructions */
};
Each program must contain one or more BPF instructions:
struct sock_filter { /* Filter block */
__u16 code; /* Actual filter code */
__u8 jt; /* Jump true */
__u8 jf; /* Jump false */
__u32 k; /* Generic multiuse field */
};
When executing the instructions, the BPF program operates on the sys‐
tem call information made available (i.e., use the BPF_ABS addressing
mode) as a (read-only) buffer of the following form:
struct seccomp_data {
int nr; /* System call number */
__u32 arch; /* AUDIT_ARCH_* value
(see <linux/audit.h>) */
__u64 instruction_pointer; /* CPU instruction pointer */
__u64 args[6]; /* Up to 6 system call arguments */
};
Because numbering of system calls varies between architectures and
some architectures (e.g., x86-64) allow user-space code to use the
calling conventions of multiple architectures, it is usually neces‐
sary to verify the value of the arch field.
It is strongly recommended to use a whitelisting approach whenever
possible because such an approach is more robust and simple. A
blacklist will have to be updated whenever a potentially dangerous
system call is added (or a dangerous flag or option if those are
blacklisted), and it is often possible to alter the representation of
a value without altering its meaning, leading to a blacklist bypass.
See also Caveats below.
The arch field is not unique for all calling conventions. The x86-64
ABI and the x32 ABI both use AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 as arch, and they run
on the same processors. Instead, the mask __X32_SYSCALL_BIT is used
on the system call number to tell the two ABIs apart.
This means that in order to create a seccomp-based blacklist for sys‐
tem calls performed through the x86-64 ABI, it is necessary to not
only check that arch equals AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64, but also to explicitly
reject all system calls that contain __X32_SYSCALL_BIT in nr.
The instruction_pointer field provides the address of the machine-
language instruction that performed the system call. This might be
useful in conjunction with the use of /proc/[pid]/maps to perform
checks based on which region (mapping) of the program made the system
call. (Probably, it is wise to lock down the mmap(2) and mprotect(2)
system calls to prevent the program from subverting such checks.)
When checking values from args against a blacklist, keep in mind that
arguments are often silently truncated before being processed, but
after the seccomp check. For example, this happens if the i386 ABI
is used on an x86-64 kernel: although the kernel will normally not
look beyond the 32 lowest bits of the arguments, the values of the
full 64-bit registers will be present in the seccomp data. A less
surprising example is that if the x86-64 ABI is used to perform a
system call that takes an argument of type int, the more-significant
half of the argument register is ignored by the system call, but vis‐
ible in the seccomp data.
A seccomp filter returns a 32-bit value consisting of two parts: the
most significant 16 bits (corresponding to the mask defined by the
constant SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL) contain one of the "action" values
listed below; the least significant 16-bits (defined by the constant
SECCOMP_RET_DATA) are "data" to be associated with this return value.
If multiple filters exist, they are all executed, in reverse order of
their addition to the filter tree—that is, the most recently
installed filter is executed first. (Note that all filters will be
called even if one of the earlier filters returns SECCOMP_RET_KILL.
This is done to simplify the kernel code and to provide a tiny speed-
up in the execution of sets of filters by avoiding a check for this
uncommon case.) The return value for the evaluation of a given sys‐
tem call is the first-seen action value of highest precedence (along
with its accompanying data) returned by execution of all of the fil‐
ters.
In decreasing order of precedence, the action values that may be
returned by a seccomp filter are:
SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS (since Linux 4.14)
This value results in immediate termination of the process,
with a core dump. The system call is not executed. By con‐
trast with SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD below, all threads in the
thread group are terminated. (For a discussion of thread
groups, see the description of the CLONE_THREAD flag in
clone(2).)
The process terminates as though killed by a SIGSYS signal.
Even if a signal handler has been registered for SIGSYS, the
handler will be ignored in this case and the process always
terminates. To a parent process that is waiting on this
process (using waitpid(2) or similar), the returned wstatus
will indicate that its child was terminated as though by a
SIGSYS signal.
SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD (or SECCOMP_RET_KILL)
This value results in immediate termination of the thread that
made the system call. The system call is not executed. Other
threads in the same thread group will continue to execute.
The thread terminates as though killed by a SIGSYS signal.
See SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS above.
Before Linux 4.11, any process terminated in this way would
not trigger a coredump (even though SIGSYS is documented in
signal(7) as having a default action of termination with a
core dump). Since Linux 4.11, a single-threaded process will
dump core if terminated in this way.
With the addition of SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS in Linux 4.14,
SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD was added as a synonym for SEC‐
COMP_RET_KILL, in order to more clearly distinguish the two
actions.
SECCOMP_RET_TRAP
This value results in the kernel sending a thread-directed
SIGSYS signal to the triggering thread. (The system call is
not executed.) Various fields will be set in the siginfo_t
structure (see sigaction(2)) associated with signal:
* si_signo will contain SIGSYS.
* si_call_addr will show the address of the system call
instruction.
* si_syscall and si_arch will indicate which system call was
attempted.
* si_code will contain SYS_SECCOMP.
* si_errno will contain the SECCOMP_RET_DATA portion of the
filter return value.
The program counter will be as though the system call happened
(i.e., the program counter will not point to the system call
instruction). The return value register will contain an
architecture-dependent value; if resuming execution, set it to
something appropriate for the system call. (The architecture
dependency is because replacing it with ENOSYS could overwrite
some useful information.)
SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO
This value results in the SECCOMP_RET_DATA portion of the fil‐
ter's return value being passed to user space as the errno
value without executing the system call.
SECCOMP_RET_TRACE
When returned, this value will cause the kernel to attempt to
notify a ptrace(2)-based tracer prior to executing the system
call. If there is no tracer present, the system call is not
executed and returns a failure status with errno set to
ENOSYS.
A tracer will be notified if it requests PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP
using ptrace(PTRACE_SETOPTIONS). The tracer will be notified
of a PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP and the SECCOMP_RET_DATA portion of
the filter's return value will be available to the tracer via
PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG.
The tracer can skip the system call by changing the system
call number to -1. Alternatively, the tracer can change the
system call requested by changing the system call to a valid
system call number. If the tracer asks to skip the system
call, then the system call will appear to return the value
that the tracer puts in the return value register.
Before kernel 4.8, the seccomp check will not be run again
after the tracer is notified. (This means that, on older ker‐
nels, seccomp-based sandboxes must not allow use of
ptrace(2)—even of other sandboxed processes—without extreme
care; ptracers can use this mechanism to escape from the sec‐
comp sandbox.)
SECCOMP_RET_LOG (since Linux 4.14)
This value results in the system call being executed after the
filter return action is logged. An administrator may override
the logging of this action via the /proc/sys/kernel/sec‐
comp/actions_logged file.
SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW
This value results in the system call being executed.
If an action value other than one of the above is specified, then the
filter action is treated as either SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS (since
Linux 4.14) or SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD (in Linux 4.13 and earlier).
/proc interfaces
The files in the directory /proc/sys/kernel/seccomp provide addi‐
tional seccomp information and configuration:
actions_avail (since Linux 4.14)
A read-only ordered list of seccomp filter return actions in
string form. The ordering, from left-to-right, is in decreas‐
ing order of precedence. The list represents the set of sec‐
comp filter return actions supported by the kernel.
actions_logged (since Linux 4.14)
A read-write ordered list of seccomp filter return actions
that are allowed to be logged. Writes to the file do not need
to be in ordered form but reads from the file will be ordered
in the same way as the actions_avail file.
It is important to note that the value of actions_logged does
not prevent certain filter return actions from being logged
when the audit subsystem is configured to audit a task. If
the action is not found in the actions_logged file, the final
decision on whether to audit the action for that task is ulti‐
mately left up to the audit subsystem to decide for all filter
return actions other than SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW.
The "allow" string is not accepted in the actions_logged file
as it is not possible to log SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW actions.
Attempting to write "allow" to the file will fail with the
error EINVAL.
Audit logging of seccomp actions
Since Linux 4.14, the kernel provides the facility to log the actions
returned by seccomp filters in the audit log. The kernel makes the
decision to log an action based on the action type, whether or not
the action is present in the actions_logged file, and whether kernel
auditing is enabled (e.g., via the kernel boot option audit=1). The
rules are as follows:
* If the action is SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW, the action is not logged.
* Otherwise, if the action is either SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS or
SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD, and that action appears in the
actions_logged file, the action is logged.
* Otherwise, if the filter has requested logging (the SECCOMP_FIL‐
TER_FLAG_LOG flag) and the action appears in the actions_logged
file, the action is logged.
* Otherwise, if kernel auditing is enabled and the process is being
audited (autrace(8)), the action is logged.
* Otherwise, the action is not logged.
On success, seccomp() returns 0. On error, if
SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC was used, the return value is the ID of the
thread that caused the synchronization failure. (This ID is a kernel
thread ID of the type returned by clone(2) and gettid(2).) On other
errors, -1 is returned, and errno is set to indicate the cause of the
error.
seccomp() can fail for the following reasons:
EACCESS
The caller did not have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its
user namespace, or had not set no_new_privs before using
SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER.
EFAULT args was not a valid address.
EINVAL operation is unknown or is not supported by this kernel
version or configuration.
EINVAL The specified flags are invalid for the given operation.
EINVAL operation included BPF_ABS, but the specified offset was not
aligned to a 32-bit boundary or exceeded
sizeof(struct seccomp_data).
EINVAL A secure computing mode has already been set, and operation
differs from the existing setting.
EINVAL operation specified SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, but the filter
program pointed to by args was not valid or the length of the
filter program was zero or exceeded BPF_MAXINSNS (4096)
instructions.
ENOMEM Out of memory.
ENOMEM The total length of all filter programs attached to the
calling thread would exceed MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH (32768)
instructions. Note that for the purposes of calculating this
limit, each already existing filter program incurs an overhead
penalty of 4 instructions.
EOPNOTSUPP
operation specified SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL, but the kernel
does not support the filter return action specified by args.
ESRCH Another thread caused a failure during thread sync, but its ID
could not be determined.
The seccomp() system call first appeared in Linux 3.17.
The seccomp() system call is a nonstandard Linux extension.
Rather than hand-coding seccomp filters as shown in the example
below, you may prefer to employ the libseccomp library, which
provides a front-end for generating seccomp filters.
The Seccomp field of the /proc/[pid]/status file provides a method of
viewing the seccomp mode of a process; see proc(5).
seccomp() provides a superset of the functionality provided by the
prctl(2) PR_SET_SECCOMP operation (which does not support flags).
Since Linux 4.4, the prctl(2) PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER operation can
be used to dump a process's seccomp filters.
Caveats
There are various subtleties to consider when applying seccomp
filters to a program, including the following:
* Some traditional system calls have user-space implementations in
the vdso(7) on many architectures. Notable examples include
clock_gettime(2), gettimeofday(2), and time(2). On such
architectures, seccomp filtering for these system calls will have
no effect. (However, there are cases where the vdso(7)
implementations may fall back to invoking the true system call, in
which case seccomp filters would see the system call.)
* Seccomp filtering is based on system call numbers. However,
applications typically do not directly invoke system calls, but
instead call wrapper functions in the C library which in turn
invoke the system calls. Consequently, one must be aware of the
following:
· The glibc wrappers for some traditional system calls may
actually employ system calls with different names in the
kernel. For example, the exit(2) wrapper function actually
employs the exit_group(2) system call, and the fork(2) wrapper
function actually calls clone(2).
· The behavior of wrapper functions may vary across
architectures, according to the range of system calls provided
on those architectures. In other words, the same wrapper
function may invoke different system calls on different
architectures.
· Finally, the behavior of wrapper functions can change across
glibc versions. For example, in older versions, the glibc
wrapper function for open(2) invoked the system call of the
same name, but starting in glibc 2.26, the implementation
switched to calling openat(2) on all architectures.
The consequence of the above points is that it may be necessary to
filter for a system call other than might be expected. Various
manual pages in Section 2 provide helpful details about the
differences between wrapper functions and the underlying system calls
in subsections entitled C library/kernel differences.
Furthermore, note that the application of seccomp filters even risks
causing bugs in an application, when the filters cause unexpected
failures for legitimate operations that the application might need to
perform. Such bugs may not easily be discovered when testing the
seccomp filters if the bugs occur in rarely used application code
paths.
Seccomp-specific BPF details
Note the following BPF details specific to seccomp filters:
* The BPF_H and BPF_B size modifiers are not supported: all
operations must load and store (4-byte) words (BPF_W).
* To access the contents of the seccomp_data buffer, use the BPF_ABS
addressing mode modifier.
* The BPF_LEN addressing mode modifier yields an immediate mode
operand whose value is the size of the seccomp_data buffer.
The program below accepts four or more arguments. The first three
arguments are a system call number, a numeric architecture
identifier, and an error number. The program uses these values to
construct a BPF filter that is used at run time to perform the
following checks:
[1] If the program is not running on the specified architecture, the
BPF filter causes system calls to fail with the error ENOSYS.
[2] If the program attempts to execute the system call with the
specified number, the BPF filter causes the system call to fail,
with errno being set to the specified error number.
The remaining command-line arguments specify the pathname and
additional arguments of a program that the example program should
attempt to execute using execv(3) (a library function that employs
the execve(2) system call). Some example runs of the program are
shown below.
First, we display the architecture that we are running on (x86-64)
and then construct a shell function that looks up system call numbers
on this architecture:
$ uname -m
x86_64
$ syscall_nr() {
cat /usr/src/linux/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | \
awk '$2 != "x32" && $3 == "'$1'" { print $1 }'
}
When the BPF filter rejects a system call (case [2] above), it causes
the system call to fail with the error number specified on the com‐
mand line. In the experiments shown here, we'll use error number 99:
$ errno 99
EADDRNOTAVAIL 99 Cannot assign requested address
In the following example, we attempt to run the command whoami(1),
but the BPF filter rejects the execve(2) system call, so that the
command is not even executed:
$ syscall_nr execve
59
$ ./a.out
Usage: ./a.out <syscall_nr> <arch> <errno> <prog> [<args>]
Hint for <arch>: AUDIT_ARCH_I386: 0x40000003
AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64: 0xC000003E
$ ./a.out 59 0xC000003E 99 /bin/whoami
execv: Cannot assign requested address
In the next example, the BPF filter rejects the write(2) system call,
so that, although it is successfully started, the whoami(1) command
is not able to write output:
$ syscall_nr write
1
$ ./a.out 1 0xC000003E 99 /bin/whoami
In the final example, the BPF filter rejects a system call that is
not used by the whoami(1) command, so it is able to successfully exe‐
cute and produce output:
$ syscall_nr preadv
295
$ ./a.out 295 0xC000003E 99 /bin/whoami
cecilia
Program source
#include <errno.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#define X32_SYSCALL_BIT 0x40000000
static int
install_filter(int syscall_nr, int t_arch, int f_errno)
{
unsigned int upper_nr_limit = 0xffffffff;
/* Assume that AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 means the normal x86-64 ABI */
if (t_arch == AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64)
upper_nr_limit = X32_SYSCALL_BIT - 1;
struct sock_filter filter[] = {
/* [0] Load architecture from 'seccomp_data' buffer into
accumulator */
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS,
(offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch))),
/* [1] Jump forward 5 instructions if architecture does not
match 't_arch' */
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, t_arch, 0, 5),
/* [2] Load system call number from 'seccomp_data' buffer into
accumulator */
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS,
(offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))),
/* [3] Check ABI - only needed for x86-64 in blacklist use
cases. Use BPF_JGT instead of checking against the bit
mask to avoid having to reload the syscall number. */
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JGT | BPF_K, upper_nr_limit, 3, 0),
/* [4] Jump forward 1 instruction if system call number
does not match 'syscall_nr' */
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, syscall_nr, 0, 1),
/* [5] Matching architecture and system call: don't execute
the system call, and return 'f_errno' in 'errno' */
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K,
SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | (f_errno & SECCOMP_RET_DATA)),
/* [6] Destination of system call number mismatch: allow other
system calls */
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
/* [7] Destination of architecture mismatch: kill task */
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
};
struct sock_fprog prog = {
.len = (unsigned short) (sizeof(filter) / sizeof(filter[0])),
.filter = filter,
};
if (seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog)) {
perror("seccomp");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
if (argc < 5) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: "
"%s <syscall_nr> <arch> <errno> <prog> [<args>]\n"
"Hint for <arch>: AUDIT_ARCH_I386: 0x%X\n"
" AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64: 0x%X\n"
"\n", argv[0], AUDIT_ARCH_I386, AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
perror("prctl");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (install_filter(strtol(argv[1], NULL, 0),
strtol(argv[2], NULL, 0),
strtol(argv[3], NULL, 0)))
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
execv(argv[4], &argv[4]);
perror("execv");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
strace(1), bpf(2), prctl(2), ptrace(2), sigaction(2), proc(5),
signal(7), socket(7)
Various pages from the libseccomp library, including:
scmp_sys_resolver(1), seccomp_init(3), seccomp_load(3),
seccomp_rule_add(3), and seccomp_export_bpf(3).
The kernel source files Documentation/networking/filter.txt and
Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst (or
Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt before Linux 4.13).
McCanne, S. and Jacobson, V. (1992) The BSD Packet Filter: A New
Architecture for User-level Packet Capture, Proceedings of the USENIX
Winter 1993 Conference
⟨http://www.tcpdump.org/papers/bpf-usenix93.pdf⟩
This page is part of release 4.15 of the Linux man-pages project. A
description of the project, information about reporting bugs, and the
latest version of this page, can be found at
https://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/.
Linux 2018-02-02 SECCOMP(2)
Pages that refer to this page: bpf(2), prctl(2), ptrace(2), sigaction(2), socketcall(2), syscalls(2), seccomp_api_get(3), seccomp_attr_set(3), proc(5), capabilities(7), signal(7)
Copyright and license for this manual page
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